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COMMENT

Robertson
The traditional family relationship has undergone a drastic, if
not revolutionary, change in recent years. The phenomenon of
the single-parent household, once rare, is now commonplace.
Families headed by single parents presently constitute a substantial minority in comparison to families headed by the traditional parental team of mother and father.1 The rise in illegitimate births has been dramatic and unprecedented, causing
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS-Lehr v.
-

reverberations throughout society.' As this situation pervades
society, the constitutional rights of unwed parents in relation to
their illegitimate children must be analyzed, defined, and
implemented.
The United States Supreme Court attempted to define
some of these rights in Lehr v. Robertson.3 In Lehr, a daughter,

Jessica, was born out of wedlock to Lorraine Robertson on November 9, 1976. Eight months after Jessica was born, Lorraine
Robertson married Richard Robertson. On December 21, 1978,
when Jessica was just over two years old, the Robertsons filed an
adoption petition in the Family Court of Ulster County, New
York. The court heard testimony from the Robertsons and received a favorable report from the Ulster County Department of
Social Services. On March 7, 1979, the Family Court entered an
1. The rise of single parent households has been dramatic over the past decade. In
1970, .8% of children under 18 lived with a single parent who had never married. By
1980, this figure increased to 2.8%. Moreover, in 1970 16.5% of children under 18 years
of age lived in a household headed by only one parent. By 1980, this figure jumped to
25.4%. (Figures include households headed by mothers only, married but spouse absent,
and father only). U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
1983-84 at 53 (104 ed. 1983).
2. There were 665,700 illegitimate births in the United States in 1980. This figure
accounted for approximately 18.4% of the total births in that year. In contrast, there
were 398,000 illegitimate births in 1970, representing 10.7% of the total births in that
year. In 1960, there were only 224,300 illegitimate births which represented 5.3% of the
total births for that year. Id. at 70.
3. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
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order of adoption for young Jessica.4
Jonathan Lehr, appellant in the present case, is assumed to
be Jessica's natural father." He had lived with Lorraine Robertson prior to Jessica's birth, and had visited both mother and
daughter at the hospital after the delivery. Nonetheless, Lehr's
name does not appear on Jessica's birth certificate. In addition,
Lehr did not resume his residence with the mother after Jessica's birth. According to the Court, appellant has provided
neither mother nor daughter with any financial support. Also, he
has never offered to marry the mother.'
In New York, a "putative father registry" is maintained in
an effort to provide notice to men who claim paternity of a child
born out of wedlock. 7 Putative fathers must voluntarily enter
their names in this "registry." It provides this class of putative
fathers with notice of any adoption proceedings initiated with
respect to their children. Before signing the adoption order in
the present case, the Ulster County Family Court examined this
registry. It found that Lehr had not entered his name on the
list.8
In addition to providing this putative father registry, New
4. Id. at 2987.
5. Id. at 2987 n.3.
6. Id. at 2988.
7. At the time Jessica's adoption order was entered, § 372-c of the New York Social
Services Law provided in pertinent part:
(1). The department shall establish a putative father registry which shall record
the names and addresses of...
(b) any person who has filed with the registry before or after the birth of a child
out of wedlock, a notice of intent to claim paternity of the child; . . .
(2). A person filing a notice of intent to claim paternity of a child shall include
therein his current address and shall notify the registry of any change of address
pursuant to procedures prescribed by regulations of the department.
(3). A person who has filed a notice of intent to claim paternity may at any time
revoke a notice of intent to claim paternity previously filed therewith and, upon
receipt of such notification by the registry, the revoked notice of intent to claim
paternity shall be deemed a nullity nunc pro tunc.
(4). An unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of a child may be introduced in evidence by any party, other than the person who filed such notice, in
any proceeding in which such fact may be relevant.
(5). The department shall, upon request, provide the names and addresses of
persons listed with the registry to any court or authorized agency, and such information shall not be divulged to any other person, except upon order of a
court for good cause shown.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 372-c (McKINNEY 1978).
8. 103 S. Ct. at 2988.
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York also required that notice of an adoption proceeding be
given to several other classes of unwed fathers. These classes included those men who had been adjudicated to be the father,
those who had been identified as the father on the child's birth
certificate, those who lived openly with the child and the child's
mother and who held themselves out to be the father, those who
had been identified as the father by the mother in a sworn, written statement, and those who were married to the child's mother
before the child was six months old.9 Lehr admittedly did not
belong to any of these classes. 10 Consequently, he did not receive
notice from either of these two possible statutory alternatives.
On January 30, 1979, approximately a month after the
Robertsons had filed their adoption petition, Lehr filed a "visitation and paternity petition" in the Family Court of Westchester
County. In this petition he asked for a determination of paternity, an order of support, and reasonable visitation rights. Notice of this proceeding was served on the Robertsons in late Feb9. At the time Jessica's adoption order was entered, subdivisions 2-4 of § 111-a of the
New York Domestic Relations Law provided in pertinent part:
(2). Persons entitled to notice, pursuant to subdivision one of this section, shall
include:
(a) any person adjudicated by a court of this state to be the father of the child;
(b) any person adjudicated by a court of another state or territory of the United
States to be the father of the child, when a certified copy of the court order has
been filed with the putative father registry, pursuant to section three hundred
seventy-two-c of the social services law;
(c) any person who has timely filed an unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity of the child, pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the social
services law;
(d) any person who is recorded on the child's birth certificate as the child's
father;
(e) any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother at the
time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's
father;
(f) any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother in
written, sworn statement; and
(g) any person who was married to the child's mother within six months subsequent to the birth of the child and prior to the execution of a surrender instrument or the initiation of a proceeding pursuant to section three hundred eightyfour-b of the social services law.
(3). The sole purpose of notice under this section shall be to enable the person
served pursuant to subdivision two to present evidence to the court relevant to
the best interest of the child.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (2-3) (McKinney 1978).
10. 103 S. Ct. at 2988.
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ruary. Four days later the Robertsons' attorney notified the
Ulster County Family Court that Lehr had commenced a paternity proceeding in Westchester County. The Ulster County
judge subsequently entered an order staying Lehr's paternity
proceeding until the judge could rule on a motion to change the
venue of that proceeding to Ulster County. On March 3, 1979,
Lehr received notice of the change of venue motion and, for the
first time, learned that an adoption proceeding was pending in
Ulster County."
On March 7, 1979, the Ulster County Family Court signed
and entered the Robertsons' adoption order.' 2 Subsequently the
Westchester Family Court granted their motion to dismiss the
paternity petition of Lehr. He did not appeal from this dismissal.' 3 Rather, on June 22, 1979, he filed a petition to vacate the
order of adoption on the grounds that it was obtained by fraud
and in violation of his constitutional rights. The Ulster County
Family Court received written and oral argument on the question of whether it had acted properly by ordering the adoption
without first providing Lehr with notice. After deliberating for
several months, the court denied the petition. 4
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York
affirmed, with one justice dissenting, the decision of the Ulster
County Family Court.' 5 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote.16 After oral orgument on the merits,
the United States Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to
hear the matter."
Lehr presented on appeal two alternative constitutional
grounds upon which New York's statutory scheme could be
found flawed. First, he contended that a putative father's relationship with his child born out of wedlock is an interest in lib11. Id. at 2988-89.
12. Id. at 2987.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2990 n.9. The Court postponed consideration of its jurisdiction until after
hearing argument on the merits. The Court concluded Lehr did draw into question the
validity of the New York statutory scheme on the ground of its being repugnant to the
federal Constitution, that the New York Court of Appeals upheld that scheme and therefore the court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2). Id. at 2990.
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erty which may not be deprived without due process of law; he
thus argued that he had a constitutional right to prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard in his daughter's adoption proceeding before he was deprived of that interest."8 Secondly, Lehr
asserted that the gender-based classification in the statute,
which denied him the right to consent to Jessica's adoption and
accorded him fewer procedural rights than her mother, violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.19
This comment will focus almost entirely on a discussion of
the Court's analysis of Lehr's due process challenge. Although
the equal protection issue is significant in the present case,
Lehr's due process argument appeared in a "novel context"
before the Court.2 0 An examination of the Court's opinion in the
present case will show that the great majority of the decision is
devoted to assessing the due process question. Therefore, this
comment will relate the major points of the Court's equal protection reasoning, but will focus primarily on a discussion of the
constitutional rights of a putative father under the due process
clause.
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law."1 Initially, the Court began its analysis by stating that
the due process clause was being invoked in a "novel context" in
Lehr.2 2 Therefore, said the Court, the "precise nature of the private interest" that is threatened by state intervention must be
examined. 3
Most parent-child relationships in formal families, where
the parents are married and the children are a product of this
marriage, are afforded constitutional protection in appropriate
cases. 2 In some cases, moreover, the Court noted that the Con18. Id. at 2990.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2990.
23. Id. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-896 (1961).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2990. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated that the "intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are woven
throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and flexibility. It
is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases." Id.
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stitution supersedes state family law and provides even greater
protection for certain formal family relationships. 25 However,
the Court stated that it had always emphasized that the rights
of parents were to be a "counterpart of the responsibilities they
have assumed. '2 The link between parental duty and parental
right was stressed most forcefully in the past when the Court
declared it a "cardinal principle 'that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.' "27 Accordingly, the
Court held that the relationship of "love and duty" in a family is
an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection. s
This line of reasoning, espousing the values of "love and
duty" and "responsibilities," was chiefly limited to formal family
relationships.2 9 The Court distinguished the present case from
past decisions, because here it was the father of a child born out
of wedlock who claimed that he had been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest in liberty.3 0 Since the appellant in the
present case is the father of a child born out of wedlock, the
Court reviewed three previous cases which examined the extent
"to which a natural father's biological relationship with his illegitimate child receives protection under the Due Process
Clause.""1
25. Id. at 2991.
26. Id. In addition, the Court stated that it always emphasized the "paramount interest in the welfare of the children" when examining the rights of parents with respect to
their offspring. Id.
27. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
28. Id. It must be noted, however, that the Court stated that the relationship of love
and duty "in a recognized family unit" is an interest entitled to constitutional protection. (emphasis added). Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2991-92.
31. Id. at 2992. The first of these cases was Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Stanley involved the constitutionality of an Illinois statute that conclusively presumed
every father of a child born out of wedlock to be an unfit parent. The Illinois statute
provided that, upon the death of the mother, the children born out of wedlock would
automatically become wards of the state. Consequently, a determination of the father's
fitness as a parent was completely usurped and held irrelevant by the Illinois procedures.
In Stanley, the father of the children born out of wedlock had lived with and supported
them throughout their lives and had lived with the mother "intermittently" for eighteen
years. When the mother died, the children automatically became wards of Illinois. The
father was given no opportunity to present evidence as to his fitness as a parent. The
Court held that the Illinois procedure violated the due process clause by destroying the
father-child relationship without granting the father an opportunity to present his side.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), was the second case cited by the Court
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Following an examination of these three cases, the Court
concluded that only when an unwed father demonstrates a "full
commitment" to the responsibilities of parenthood can it be said
that his interest in personal contact with his illegitimate child
acquires substantial protection under the due process clause. 2
The mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent
constitutional protection. 3 If the natural father grasps the opportunity his biological connection to a child provides and accepts "some measure of responsibility for the child's future," he
may enjoy both the "blessings" of the parent-child relationship
and constitutional protection against any arbitrary dissolution of
this relationship.3 4 However, if he fails to act in such a responsible manner, the "Federal Constitution will not automatically
compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
35
interests lie."
Significantly, the Court stated that this was not a case
which dealt with the constitutional rights of a putative father. According to the Court,
Quilloin involved the constitutionality of a Georgia statute which authorized the adoption of a child born out of wedlock over the objection of the natural father. The father in
Quilloin had never legitimated the child, attempting to do so only after the mother and
her new husband had filed the adoption petition. The Court unanimously agreed with
the trial court that the adoption of the child by the new husband was in the "best interests of the child," and that the state's actions were consistent with the due process
clause.
A third case dealing with a similar problem was Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380
(1979). Caban involved the conflicting claims of two natural parents who had maintained
joint custody of their children until they were two and four years old, respectively. The
natural father challenged the validity of an order authorizing the mother's new husband
to adopt the children. The father posited that he was denied his rights under both the
equal protection clause and the due process clause. A majority of the Court upheld his
equal protection claim, finding it unnecessary to address his due process claim.
The Court in Lehr noted, however, that the comments of the dissent in Caban concerning the natural father's due process challenge were "instructive." 103 S. Ct. at 2992.
This was because the four dissenting justices clearly identified the "distinction between a
mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility." Id.
The Court quoted Justice Stewart's dissent in Caban, which stated that "parental rights
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring." 441 U.S. at 397. Furthermore, the Court noted
that the other three dissenters in Caban were prepared to "assume that, if and when one
develops, the relationship between a father and his natural child is entitled to protection
against arbitrary state action as a matter of due process." Id. at 2993.
32. Id. at 2993.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 2994.
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where the issue involved assessing the constitutional adequacy
of a state's procedures for terminating a "developed relationship."3 6 The Court therefore stressed that Lehr had "never had
any significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship"
with his daughter.3 7 The Court stated that it was concerned
solely with the question of whether New York had adequately
protected Lehr's opportunity to form such a relationship. 8
The Court then addressed the question of the adequacy of
the New York statutes to provide putative fathers with the
means to establish a "significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship" with their children.3 9 The statutory scheme provided by New York, that of a "putative father registry," adequately provided "interested putative fathers" with notice."'
The Court stressed that all the lower New York courts had observed that the matter of notice was entirely within Lehr's voluntary control." By availing himself of the "putative father registry," Lehr could have guaranteed that he would have received
notice of any adoption proceedings concerning his daughter.4 2
The possibility that he was ignorant of the law, according to the
Court, "cannot be sufficient reason for criticizing the law itself." 3 The Court held that the law adequately protected the
interests of putative fathers who voluntarily took advantage of
its notice provisions. The Court concluded that it could not
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The Court emphasized that it was concerned only with whether the New York
statutory scheme adequately protected Lehr's opportunity to form a significant and developed relationship with his daughter. According to the Court, Lehr had not substanti-

ated or pursued his relationship with his daughter so as to have developed a protected
interest which would automatically compel procedural due process piotection. The Court
concluded that the statutory scheme was adequate to protect Lehr's opportunity, if he so
desired, to form a relationship with his daughter. Id. at 2995.
39. Id. at 2994. The adequacy of New York's attempt to provide fathers with the
opportunity to establish a "significant" relationship with their illegitimate children was
seen by the Court to be embodied in § 111-a of the Domestic Relations Law. See supra
note 9 and accompanying text.

40. Id. The Court made reference to the New York statutory scheme, which provided
putative fathers with a "putative fathers registry." This "registry," its purpose, and its
provisions are discussed supra note 7 and accompanying text.

41. 103 S. Ct. at 2995.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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"characterize the state's conclusion as arbitrary."""
Lehr further argued that, even if the New York statutes adequately protected his opportunity to form a relationship with
his daughter, he was nevertheless entitled to "special notice,"
because the trial court and the mother knew that he had filed an
affiliation proceeding in another court.4 5 The Court answered
this claim by flatly stating that "this argument amounts to nothing more than an indirect attack on the notice provisions of the
New York statute. '46 The Court declared that the Constitution
does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give "special
notice" to nonparties who are capable of asserting and protecting their own rights.4 7 Therefore, no merit was found in Lehr's
contention that his constitutional rights were violated because
the family court "strictly complied" with the notice provisions of
the statute.4 8
After analyzing and dismissing Lehr's due process challenge,
the Court addressed his equal protection claim. In a significantly
briefer exposition of its views, the Court first stated that the
concept of equal justice requires the states to govern impartially.4 9 In addition, it asserted that a state may not draw distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that
are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.5 0 The procedures adopted by New York were specifically designed to promote the best interests of the child, protect the rights of interested third parties, and ensure promptness and finality. 5 The
majority noted that Lehr did not contest the importance of
44. Id. The Court concluded that the statutes adopted by New York were reasonable
and non-arbitrary in carrying out the intent of the Legislature. The Court refused to
place itself in the position of the legislators, stating that "regardless of whether we would
have done likewise if we were legislators instead of judges, we cannot characterize the
state's conclusion as arbitrary." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In support of this proposition, the Court stated: "The legitimate state interests in facilitating the adoption of young children and having the adoption proceeding
completed expeditiously that underlie the entire statutory scheme also justify a trial
judge's determination to require all interested parties to adhere precisely to the procedural requirements of the statute." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. See also New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979).
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2995. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
51. 103 S. Ct. at 2996. The Court noted that appellant did not contest the vital importance of these ends to the people of New York. Id. at 2996 n.25.
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these objectives. He did highlight, however, certain statutory
provisions which provided the mother of an illegitimate child
the right to veto an adoption, while denying that right to certain
classes of putative fathers. Lehr contended that this procedure,
based solely on gender-classification, was "invidious."5
The existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship
between a parent and child is a relevant factor in evaluating the
rights of a parent.5 3 The Court reiterated its rationale from Quilloin v. Walcott54 that the natural fathers in both that case and
the case at bar "had never shouldered any significant responsibility" with respect to the daily care and supervision of the children."5 The Court found that since, like the father in Quilloin,
the appellant in this case never established a substantial relationship with his daughter, the New York statutory scheme was
not "invidious" and did not deny Lehr equal protection of the
law.56 In conclusion, the Court declared that "if one parent has
an established custodial relationship with the child and the
other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state
from according the two parents different legal rights."57
52. Id. at 2996.
53. Id.
54. 434 U.S. at 256; see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. 103 S. Ct. at 2996. The Court quoted from its opinion in Quilloin to the effect
that the putative father in that case, like the appellant in the present case, "never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection or care of the child." 434 U.S. at 256.
56. 103 S. Ct. at 2996.
57. Id. at 2996-97. The Court distinguished its decision in Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380 (1979). The Court stated that, in Caban, it had held unconstitutional the New
York statutes involved in the present case as applied in certain classes of cases in which
the mother and father were in fact similarly situated with regard to their relationship
with the child. Caban, according to Justice Stevens, posited that the equal protection
clause was violated when a mother was granted a veto over the adoption of her children,
but did not grant such a power to a father who had admitted paternity and had partici-

pated in the rearing of the children. Justice Stevens believed that, in Caban, "the Court
made it clear . . . that if the father had not 'come forward to participate in the rearing of
his child, nothing in the Equal Protection Clause [would] preclude the State from withholding from him the privilege of vetoing the adoption of that child.' " 103 S. Ct. at 2996,
quoting from Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979).
In Justice Stevens' opinion, the parents in the present case were not like the parents
in Caban. In the present case, "appellant never established any custodial, personal, or
financial relationship" with his daughter. 103 S. Ct. at 2996. Therefore, the parents in
both cases were not "similarly situated," and could constitutionally be accorded different
legal rights. Id.
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A strong dissent was filed by Justice White, which was
joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. The dissent stated
that the question in the case was whether New York could constitutionally deny the natural father, Lehr, notice and an opportunity to be heard when New York, in reality, had actual notice
of his existence, whereabouts, and interest in his daughter, Jessica." Justice White stated that "if the entry of an adoption order in this case deprived Lehr of a constitutionally protected interest," he is entitled to "notice and an opportunity to be
heard.""'
There is a divergence between the facts as related by the
majority and by the dissent. The dissent prefaces its recitation
of the facts by declaring that they are "according to Lehr."60
The opinion then states that Lehr contends that he lived with
appellee Lorraine Robertson for approximately two years immediately prior to the birth of Jessica. Appellant also stated that,
after Jessica's birth, he visited mother and daughter each day in
the hospital during their stay. After this the mother, Lorraine
Robertson, allegedly concealed her whereabouts from appellant.
According to the dissent, Lehr never ceased in his efforts to locate Lorraine Robertson. 1 On those sporadic occasions when he
did find the mother, he visited with' 62her and his daughter to the
"extent she was willing to permit.

Between August, 1977, and August, 1978, Lehr was unable
to locate Lorraine Robertson. During that time she married
Richard Robertson. Lehr, with the aid of a detective agency,6"
located the mother and his daughter in August, 1978. At that
time he allegedly offered to provide financial support and set up
a trust fund for Jessica, but her mother refused. Lehr then retained counsel, who wrote to appellee in early December, 1978,
requesting that she permit Lehr to visit Jessica and, in the alter58.
59.

103 S. Ct. at 2997.
Id.

60. Id.
61.

Id. Throughout the dissent, the divergence between what the majority and what

the dissenters viewed as relevant facts was substantial. In an effort to convey this divergence, this comment will discuss the points where the emphasis and view of the dissent
disagrees with the majority.
62. Id. at 2997.
63. Id.
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native, threatening legal action on his behalf. 4 In a footnote, the
dissent found it "noteworthy" that the mother has never denied

that Lehr is the father. 5
Justice White's dissent initially postulated that, to determine what constitutes a protected liberty interest, the Court
must look not to the "weight" but to the "nature" of the interest
at stake. 6 Consequently, the dissent stressed that the "nature of
the interest at stake" in the present case is that of a natural
parent in his child, an interest that "has long been recognized
and accorded constitutional protection."6 7 Furthermore, it is
"beyond dispute" that both a putative father and his child have
a "compelling interest" in the outcome of an adoption proceeding that may result in the termination of their relationship.
The dissent contends that Lehr's version of the facts
"paints a far different picture than that portrayed by the majority . . . [which] obviously does not tell the whole story."69 Accordingly, appellant has never been afforded "an opportunity to

present his case."' 70 Therefore, Lehr could not establish his inter-

est during the adoption proceeding, a proceeding which could
conclusively terminate all his rights in relation to his daughter.
The dissent stressed that it could not make such a judgment
based on the quality or substance of a relationship without a
complete and developed factual record. 1
64. Id.
65. Id. n.1. Justice White stated that "[tihe majority correctly assumes that Lehr is
in fact Jessica's father." Id.
66. Id. at 2998. The dissent quoted from Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 57071 (1972). The dissent argued that "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at
stake . . . to see if the interest is within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection ..
Id. (emphasis in original).
67. 103 S. Ct. at 2998.
68. Id. The dissent supported this position by quoting from Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981), which stated that "[a] parent's interest in the
accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is . . . a
commanding one." Id.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 2998.
70. Id. The dissent takes specific umbrage at the fact that the majority's recitation of
the facts, of the case, as well as its opinion, relied on its view that Lehr did not seek to
establish a legal tie with his daughter until after she was two years old.
71. Id. at 2998. The dissent noted that it could not "fairly make a judgment" based
on the record that was before it. Lehr could not "establish his interest during the adoption proceedings, for it is the failure to provide Lehr notice and an opportunity to be
heard there that is at issue here." Id. As a result, there exists, in the dissent's opinion, an
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Justice White additionally argued that a "mere biological
relationship is not as unimportant as the majority suggests."7 In
fact, the "biological connection" is of itself a relationship that
creates a protected liberty interest. 3 The nature of the interest
at issue is a parent-child relationship; how well-developed that
relationship is goes to its "weight," not its "nature.

' 74

All that is

required to create a liberty interest is a "determination" of the
"fact" that the parent-child relationship exists, a fact which,
stated the dissent, "even the majority agrees must be assumed
to be established.

7

5

The dissent concedes that due process does not require actual notice to every putative father.7 6 The procedures of a state,
however, must represent at least a "reasonable effort" to determine the identity of the putative father and give him notice.7 7 In
the present case, according to the dissent, there can be no doubt
that New York knew the identity and location of Lehr. 7 s Because of this fact, Lehr was entitled to due process, which inherinadequately developed and incomplete factual record upon which a judgment on the
quality and substance of the parent-child relationship must be based.
This divergence of opinion concerning the factual background of the case is where
the majority and dissent become diametrically opposed. The majority concluded that
Lehr, according to the sufficient record before it, had not tried to develop any type of
significant relationship with his daughter. As a result, the majority held that Lehr had
not substantiated his relationship with his daughter in such a way as to guarantee procedural due process protection. The dissent, in contrast, argued that the record before it
was too scant and undeveloped to provide a background upon which a fair decision regarding Lehr's relationship to his daughter could be reached. Id.
72. Id. at 2999.
73. Id.
74. Id. The dissent supported this proposition in a footnote, stating:
The majority's citation of Quilloin and Caban as examples that the Constitution
does not require the same procedural protections for the interests of all unwed
fathers is disingenuous. Neither case involved notice and opportunity to be
heard. In both, the unwed fathers were notified and participated as parties in
the adoption proceedings. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. [at] 253 . ..
Caban v.Mohammed, 441 U.S. [at] 385 n.3.
Id. at 2999 n.4.
75. Id. at 2999.
76. Id. In addition, Justice White stated that due process does not require that adoptive parents or a state conduct an "exhaustive search of records or an intensive investigation before a final adoption order may be entered." Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Justice White also pointed out that both the mother and the court entering
the adoption order knew "precisely where [the father] was and how to give him actual
notice." Id.
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ently provides the "right to be heard" as fundamental.7 9 By
filing a "paternity and visitation petition," Lehr made himself
known to the state as an interested party. Justice White stated
that "[ilt makes little sense to me to deny notice to a father who
has not placed his name [on the putative father registry] but
who has unmistakably identified himself by filing suit to establish his paternity and has notified the adoption court of his action and his interest." 80 Lehr, according to the dissent, made
himself known by legitimate means, and therefore it is the
"sheerest formalism to deny him a hearing because he informed
the state in the wrong manner." 81 Justice White thereupon
deemed it unnecessary to address appellant's equal protection
claim, for he felt that Lehr's rights as "guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause" had been violated. 2
Perhaps the best way to examine Lehr is by viewing it as
the culmination of a comparatively short line of cases addressing
the extent of a putative father's due process rights. One of the
first cases dealing with the rights of a putative father was Stanley v. Illinois,"s which was cited by the Court in Lehr. Before
examining Stanley, however, we must first clarify what is meant
by due process.
The Supreme Court stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Company,84 that "there can be no doubt that at a minimum [the words of the due process clause] require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3000. The state contends that Lehr was not entitled to notice because he
did not take advantage of the "putative father register" and did not fall into any of the
other classes of putative fathers entitled to notice. Justice White argued that this contention is without merit, for New York did know Lehr's "identity, location and interest"
before the final adoption order was signed. As such, New York's approach to the situation "represents a grudging and crabbed approach to due process." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 3001. In conclusion, Justice White noted that New York's undoubted interest in the finality of adoption orders and the expediency with which they are reached is
not "well served by a procedure that will deny notice and a hearing to a father whose
identity and location are known." Id. Additionally, this case illustrates that denying such
fathers notice and a hearing may "result in years of additional litigation." Id. These
results thus would detract from the state's interest in finality and expediency.
83. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
84. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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the case."'85 Therefore, it would seem elementary that one must

first have a life, liberty or property interest sufficient to compel
due process protection. A review of this progression of cases will
examine the Supreme Court's definitions of what constitutes a
liberty interest of a putative father in relation to his illegitimate
child.
In Stanley, the petitioner, the father of three children,
never married the mother but had lived with her "intermittently" for eighteen years and with the children throughout
their lives.8 6 When the children were in their teens, their mother
died. An Illinois statute provided that, in the case of children
born out of wedlock, when the mother died, they were to become
wards of the state automatically.8 7 The father had no say in the
proceeding, nor was he even informed of the proceeding. He was
conclusively presumed to be an unfit parent, simply because of
the fact that he had not married the mother. 8 In fact, Stanley's
actual fitness as a parent was wholly irrelevant to the state."
Justice White delivered the majority opinion in Stanley. He
also wrote the dissent in Lehr. The Stanley Court felt that the
"precise nature of the private interest" affected by governmental
intervention must be examined.90 In Stanley, the private interest affected was that "of a man in the children he has sired and
raised."9 Justice White reiterated that the Court had always
held that it is a "cardinal principle" that the "custody, care, and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents."9 ' According to
the Court, the law had not refused to recognize family relationships not formally legitimated by marriage." The Stanley Court
85. Id. at 313.
86. 405 U.S. at 646.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 647.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 650-51. The Court quoted from Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961), which stated that "what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action." Id.

91. 405 U.S. at 651.
92. Id. The Court incorporated this quote from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944), into its opinion and noted that it has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. 405 U.S. at 651.
93. Id.
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conceded that it may be that "most unwed fathers are unsuitable and neglectful fathers," but stressed that the record did not
indicate in any way that Stanley was or had been a neglectful
father who did not accept the responsibility of caring for and
supporting his children.9 4 The Illinois procedure assumed that
Stanley was unfit as a parent. The Court found that this assumption could not stand under the weight of the due process
clause because the liberty interest involved "the dismemberment
of [Stanley's] family."9' 5 In addition, the Court held that it had
"concluded that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled
to a hearing on their fitness as parents before their children are
removed from their custody.""8
It seems fairly clear that, in the Stanley Court's opinion, it
is most significant that Stanley, though he never married the
mother, had "sired and raised" his children. He obviously supported, nurtured, and cared for them. There is also evidence
that he was never "neglectful" of his children. Also, the state
was engaged in a process of the "dismemberment" of his family
and the taking of his children from his custody.
Evidently, Stanley did take substantial responsibility for his
children. He did, in essence, establish a formal family relationship outside of the traditional family structure. On the facts, the
fathers in Stanley and Lehr can be distinguished. Lehr, apparently, never stepped forward to accept any parental responsibility. In comparison to Stanley, he never "raised" his daughter.
There were no emotional or financial ties between Lehr and his
daughter that arose out of any connection other than their biological link. It seemed paramount to the Court in Stanley that
the unwed father had actually shouldered a significant portion
97
of the parental responsibility.
The situation that the Court confronted in Quilloin v.
Walcott's more closely resembled the relationship in Lehr. In
Quilloin, the father of an illegitimate child never married the
94. Id. at 654-55.
95. Id. at 658.
96. Id. (emphasis added). This portion of the Court's opinion is emphasized because
it is important to recognize how carefully the Court qualified its holding. The point is
that this holding seems to apply to parents who already have custody of their children.
In Stanley, the father had and sought to retain custody of his children. Id. at 650 n.4.
97. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.'
98. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
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mother or established a home with her. 9 The mother later married and her husband subsequently attempted to adopt the illegitimate child. The Georgia statute in question0 0 provided that
the consent of the mother alone was required for adoption of an
illegitimate child. To acquire this same veto power, a putative
father had to either marry the mother,10 1 or obtain a court order
declaring the child legitimate and capable of inheriting from the
father. 10 2 The father in Quilloin did not petition for legitimation
of his child at any time during the eleven years between her
birth and the filing of the adoption petition. 03 After the adoption proceeding was commenced, the father filed an application
seeking visitation rights, a petition for legitimation, and an objection to the adoption. 04
In his opinion, Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous
Court when he stated that he had "little doubt that the Due
Process Clause would be offended 'if a State were to attempt to
force the breakup of a natural family. . . without some showing
of unfitness ...
105 In addition, Justice Marshall concluded

that Quilloin was not a case in which the unwed father at any
time "had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child."'0 6
Furthermore, the result of the adoption in this case would give
"full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result
desired by all concerned, except appellant.' ' 0 7 Since the natural

father in Quilloin had never "exercised actual or legal custody
over his child," it was consequently determined that he "never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the
daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child."' 0 8
For these reasons, the Court was of the opinion that Quilloin
99. Id. at 247.
100. Section 74-403(3) of the Georgia Code provided in relevant part, "Illegitimate
children-If the child be illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice [in
order to permit an adoption]." Id. at 248-49.
101. 434 U.S. at 249 n.3.
102. Id. at 249 n.4.
103. Id. at 249.
104. Id. at 249-50.
105. Id. at 255. The Court quoted from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-863 (1977).
106. 434 U.S. at 255.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 256.
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had not been substantively denied any corresponding due process protection.
The Court stressed the fact that the father in Quilloin never
"shouldered any significant responsibility with respect [to his]
. . . child."' 1 9 This is clearly in contrast to the father in Stanley
but similar to the father in Lehr. It must also be noted that appellant in Quilloin did not object to the notice that he received,
but rather to the substantial nature of the interest being deprived." 0 However, the Court noted that the father never sought
custody of his child, never undertook any significant responsibility for raising the child, and eventually attempted to alter an
already existing formal family relationship. As can be seen,
many of the important facts granting Stanley due process protection are the same facts that, in their absence, deny Quilloin
the same.
The last case in this short progression is Caban v. Mohammed."' In Caban, the natural father had lived with the mother
for nearly five years, during which time she gave birth to two
children. Throughout this five-year period the couple never married, though they held themselves out to be husband and wife. "'
Appellant was identified as the father on both children's birth
certificates." 3 At the time he left the mother, he had contributed a significant amount of support throughout this period."'
After the father left, he was allowed to visit the children approximately once a week for nine months." 5
The mother of the children subsequently married another
man and, two years after leaving appellant, the married couple
filed an adoption petition." 6 Two months later the natural father, also newly married, filed a cross-petition for adoption." 7
The statute involved in Caban set forth the classes of parents
109. Id.
110. Id. at 253; see id. at 250 n.7, which states that the father had been notified by
Georgia's Department of Human Resources that an adoption petition had been filed.
111. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
112. Id. at 382.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 383.
117. Id.

1984]

COMMENT

whose consent was required for adoption.1 1 At the time, appellant, as the natural father, did not belong to any of these classes.
By contrast, a natural mother's consent was always required.
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, noted that the natural father in Caban was given sufficient notice and was permitted to participate as a party in the adoption proceedings, and
therefore could not contend that he was denied the procedural
due process held to be requisite in Stanley."9 Consequently, the
Court's discussion addressed primarily the appellant's equal protection claim. Nevertheless, the majority opinion, as well as the
dissent, shed light on the Lehr analysis.
In Caban, the Court placed significance on the fact that the
father had "established a substantial relationship" with his children and had admitted his paternity. 120 In fact, reference was
made to the Court's decision in Quilloin, where it was felt that
the Court specifically "emphasized the importance of the appellant's failure to act as a father towards his children.' 21 The
Court also recognized the presumptive quality of the New York
statute, especially when it affects unwed fathers, like Caban,
who have "manifested a significant paternal interest" in their
22
children.1
In attempting to analyze the progression from Caban to
Lehr, it may be, as Justice Stevens stated in Lehr, more "in118. At the time of the adoption proceeding, Section 111 of the New York Domestic
Relations Law provided, in relevant part:
Subject to the limitations hereinafter set forth consent to adoption shall be required as follows:
1. Of the adoptive child, if over fourteen years of age, unless the judge or surrogate in his discretion dispenses with consent;
2. Of the parents or surviving parent, whether adult or infant, of a child born in

wedlock;
3. Of the mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKINNEY 1977).
119. Justice Powell explained in a footnote:
As the appellant was given due notice and was permitted to participate as a
party in the adoption proceedings, he does not contend that he was denied the
procedural due process held to be requisite in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
441 U.S. at 385 n.3.
120. Id. at 393.
121. Id. at 389 n.7.
122. In addition to discriminating against fathers who have "manifested a significant
paternal interest in the child," the Court concluded that the New York statutes also
discriminated against unwed fathers "even when their identity is known." Id. at 394.
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structive" to examine the dissenting opinions in Caban. Justice
Stewart filed a dissent which reflected his view that "parental
rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring."12 3 Justice Stewart also stated that "an unwed father
who has not come forward and who has established no relationship with [his] child is plainly not in a [position] similar to the
mother's. '' 124 He did recognize, however, that in Caban the
Court was examining the situation of an "unwed father who
1 5
[had] established a paternal relationship with his children.1
Justice Stevens, who wrote the other dissenting opinion in
Caban, was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. He found the due process issue raised by the appellant to
be more troublesome than his equal protection challenge. 126 This
dissent espoused the view that a relationship between a father
and his natural child, "if and when one develops," is entitled to
constitutional protection against state interference. 127 As support for this proposition, Justice Stevens cited to a recent Court
decision12 1 which held that biological relationships are not an exclusive determination of a family.' 29 Finally, the dissent recognized that the Court had indicated that "an adoption decree
that terminates the relationship is constitutionally justified by a
finding that the father has abandoned or mistreated the
child."' 13 0
A lineal examination of the above cases leads to the conclusion that the Supreme Court may very well require that a puta123. In contrast to his opinion that parental rights require that relationships between
parent and child be more than biological, Justice Stewart felt that "the mother carries
and bears the child, and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of
the father's parental claims must be gauged by other measures." Id. at 397.
124. Id. at 399. Justice Stewart further expounded that "New York's consent distinctions have clearly been made on this basis, and in my view they do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. This line of reasoning seems to
have been wholly adopted by the Court in Lehr. See supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
125. Caban, 441 U.S. at 399.
126. Id. at 414.
127. Id. This passage was quoted by Justice Stevens in his majority opinion in Lehr.
See 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
128. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
129. Id. at 843.
130. 441 U.S. at 414.
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tive father must establish a "significant relationship" and take
"substantial responsibility" for the care, custody, and supervision of his child before he is entitled to constitutional protection
and recognition. This proposition is supported by commentators
who have reflected that "the unwed father's interest springs not
from his biological tie with his illegitimate child, but rather,
from the relationship he has established with and the responsibility he has shouldered for the child.' 31 Additionally, it has
been noted that a father's failure to show a substantial interest
in his child will remove from him the full constitutional protection afforded the parental rights of other, more responsible,
classes of parents. 13 2 The Court itself noted in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families'33 that, at least where the protection
afforded by the due process clause is involved, biological relationships alone are not sufficient to create a constitutionally protected "family."' 3 4
The Lehr Court appears to adhere strictly to these principles. Concepts of "love and duty," "full recognition of the responsibilities of parenthood," "an actual relationship of parental
responsibility," and "significant custodial, personal, or financial
relationship[s]" with respect to illegitimate children are prominent in Lehr. These concepts are a direct outgrowth of the lineal
progression of Stanley-Quilloin-Caban. An overview of these
cases almost compels the judicial determination in Lehr. It
would seem that the Court has taken a large step in ultimately
defining the constitutional rights of putative fathers. Unless an
unwed father of an illegitimate child accepts some sort of "significant responsibility" or nurtures a "substantial relationship"
with his child, the Supreme Court would be reluctant to recognize that his position as a biological father is so substantial or
fundamental that it constitutes a liberty interest guaranteed
procedural due process protection.
John J. Brogan
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